Academy of Military Sciences of the Russian Federation. Legal regulation of preparing mobilization human resources in pre-revolutionary Russia Comparative table of mobilization human resources of Europe

26.11.2020

PLAN

Introduction

1. Characteristics of modern military-political trends

2. Role and place of Russia in the world community

3. The system of national interests of Russia

Conclusion

Introduction

National security is defined as a state of persistence of personality, society and states from internal and external threats, which allows for constitutional rights, freedoms, decent quality and standard of living of citizens, sovereignty, territorial integrity and sustainable development of the Russian Federation, defense and state security.

From the point of view of law, the national security of Russia at the present stage provides more than 200 regulatory legal acts:

Federal Constitutional Laws (FKZ No. 1 dated January 30, 2002 "On Military Position"; FKZ No. 3 of 30.05.2001 "On Emergency");

Federal Laws (FZ No. 61 dated 05/31/1996 "On Defense"; FZ No. 53 of 28.03.1998 "On Military Duty and Military Service"; Federal Law No. 31 of 26.02.1997 "On Mobilization Training and Mobilization In Russian federation");

Codes of the Russian Federation;

Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation (Decree of May 12, 2009 No. 537 "On the Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation until 2020", Decree of February 05, 2010 No. 146 "On the military doctrine of the Russian Federation");

Decisions of the Government of the Russian Federation;

Federal target programs, concepts, doctrines, strategies, etc.;

Departmental regulations.

In the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020, there are basic concepts that determine the content and direction to ensure the national security of the Russian Federation.

The national interests of the Russian Federation are a set of domestic and external needs of the state in ensuring the security and sustainable development of the individual, society and the state.

The threat of national security is a direct or indirect possibility of damaging constitutional rights, freedoms, decent quality and level of living of citizens, sovereignty and territorial integrity, sustainable development of the Russian Federation, defense and state security.

Strategic national priorities are the most important areas of ensuring national security, which are being implemented by the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens of the Russian Federation, the sustainable socio-economic development and protection of the country's sovereignty, its independence and territorial integrity are carried out.

National security system - forces and means of ensuring national security.

The forces of ensuring national security - the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies in which federal legislation provides for military and (or) law enforcement service, as well as federal government bodies involved in ensuring the national security of the state on the basis of the legislation of the Russian Federation.

Metal security tools - technologies, as well as technical, software, linguistic, legal, organizational funds, including telecommunication channels used in the national security system for collecting, forming, processing, transferring or receiving information about the state of national security and measures to strengthen it .

Characteristics of modern military-political trends

The modern stage of world development is characterized by acute socio-economic conflicts and political contradictions.

The end of the bipolar block system led to a significant change in the principles of strategic stability in the world. Global and regional security are shifted from issues of war and peace to political, financial and economic, demographic and other issues.

At the beginning of the XXI century, processes to increase the role of military force to ensure the political and economic interests of the states of the world were marked.

Today's global military-political situation is characterized by a combination of two main trends:

The desire to form a new, more equitable and democratic system of international economic and political relations;

The expansion of the practice of applying armed forces based on national solutions and outside the UN mandate.

Along with these trends, the stereotypes of the Cold War period continue to exist, which significantly complicating the international situation.

Of essential importance for understanding the specifics of Russian foreign policy interests, and therefore the roles and places of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, they acquire new global trends:

In the modern system of military-political relations to the fore, the opposition to new challenges, stimulated globalization processes. The importance of international cooperation of power structures, including special services and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, increases dramatically.

It becomes a reality to implement international operations on the use of force outside of traditional military political organizations.

There is a further increase in the role of the economy in the foreign policy priorities of states.

Splicing of domestic and international terrorism.

The importance of non-state participants of the system of international relations to determine the nature of the foreign policy priorities of various states of the world has significantly improved.

<*> Smirnov A.V., Mazanik T.A. Legal Regulation of Training of Mobilization Human Resources in Prevevolutionary Russia.

Smirnov Alexey Vasilyevich, Associate Professor of the Department of Military Administration, Administrative and Financial Rights of the Military University of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Candidate of Legal Sciences.

Mazanik Tatyana Anatolyevna, teacher of the Department of Military Administration, Administrative and Financial Law of the Military University of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

The article discusses the main factors whose influence has led to the need to create mobilization human resources. Analyzed theoretical basis The mobilization, the provisions of which were implemented and tested in a number of regulatory and guidance documents that determine the content and procedure for developing a mobilization plan, the procedure for conducting in each military unit of verification and experienced mobilization. It is shown that the quantitative characteristics of military-trained mobilization human resources and the guarantee of their arrival during the period of mobilization activities were governed by the adoption of new and improving existing regulatory legal acts.

Keywords: mobilization preparation and mobilization, mobilization theory, mobilization need, military accounting system, military-trained mobilization human resources, replenishment of losses, recruitment service, all-class military service, principles of the host of the army and fleet.

The Article Considers The Fundamental Factors, The Influence of Which Led to The Subsity of Creation Of Mobilization Human Resources; analyses the theoretical grounds for execution of mobilization, the provisions of which were implemented and applied in a number of normative and guiding documents determining the contents and procedure of elaboration of mobilization plan, procedure of verification and approbation of mobilizations in each military unit, shows that Quantitative-Quality Characteristics of Military-Educated Human Resources and Security of Arrival Thereof During The Period of Mobilization Measures Are Regulated At The Account of Adoption Of New and Improvement Of The Existing Normative Legal Acts.

Key Words: Mobilization Training and Mobilization, Theory of Mobilization, Mobilization Need, System of Military Record, Military-Educated Mobilization Human Resources, Compensation of Losses, Recruit Duty, Allclasses Military Duty, Principles of Manning Of Army and Fleet.

The theory and practices of training and accumulation of mobilization human resources were born together with the theory and practice of using mass armies. Three hundred and three years ago, wars were conducted by armies and groups of troops (in understanding of that time), which were held in peacetime in full, necessary for the conduct of armed struggle. Tasks in wars and military clashes of the state solved cash with military forces, without an increase in the combat composition of the troops both the day before and during the war<1>.

<1> Dukelsky P.A. The beginning of military charters in Russia // Moscow magazine. 2003. N 6.

Until 1834, the total service life of the lower ranks in Russia was 25 years<2> (This period was established from 1793), and they were in service before the dismissal of resignation; The reserve of the trained military cause of people was not. In peacetime, the army was completed, and in wartime was replenished with recruits delivered by the population of the recruitous resort introduced by Peter I. Parts of the troops were kept in peacetime, as a rule, in the same numerical composition as in the military.

<2> Denisova M.M., Portnov M.E. Russian weapons of the XI - XIX centuries. M., 1953. P. 125.

However, with the growing armed conflict in larger military actions to address the tasks of achieving the political, economic and military purposes of the war in cash of peaceful army, it became impossible. At the same time, with the expansion of the wars, their duration increased, the number of attracted forces and means - people, horses, the simplest mechanisms, machines, etc.

At the same time, the states, even a strong economically, were unable, especially in peacetime, contain large army, but the war required the participation of a large number of troops<3>.

<3> Zaisonchkovsky P.A. Autocracy and Russian army at the turn of the XIII - XIX centuries. M., 1973. P. 36 - 45.

This contradiction in many countries of the world was resolved by creating a reserve (mobilization) people, military property and equipment, which was used to build forces and funds on the eve and during the war, as well as to replenish losses<4>.

<4>

In Russia, the beginning of the formation of a military-trained reserve of the army in order to increase its number in the case of the war was found in 1834, when the Decree of the Emperor Nicholas I dated August 30 (September 12), the term of the military service of the lower ranks decreased from 25 to 20 years, followed by staying For 5 years in the so-called indefinite vacation<5>. Moreover, temporary (annual) vacations were established in which soldiers who were 8 years old on the actual service could be dismissed. The same decree of the lower ranks, unwillingly served 15 years, was allowed to dismiss in a permanent vacation for 5 years. With the announcement of the war, all these holidays were again subject to calling into the army and partly formed spare troops, and the part was directly carried out to strengthen the existing or field parts. However, the stock of such holidays was too small (for example, in front of the Crimean War of 1853 - 1856. He was a little more than 212 thousand people<6>).

<5> Decree of August 30, 1834 // Complete Assembly of the Laws of the Russian Empire. 1834. T. V.
<6> Gudim-Levkovich P. Sketch of the historical development of the Armed Forces of Russia // Military Collection. 1876. N 1 - 4.

From this period they take the beginning of the mobilization sprouts ("Mobilization" FR. - "Bringing into the active state of any forces and funds who previously in a state of relative rest").

Thus, the origin of the concept of "mobilization human resources" is associated with the need to build forces and funds on the eve and during the war, as well as to replenish losses. At the first stage of the development of mobilization and mobilization preparation (1834 - 1860), an attempt to solve this problem was carried out at the expense of a minor reduction of the term of the military service of the lower ranks with their subsequent stays in indefinite leave. However, the creation of the mass army required more cardinal measures.

The Crimean War demanded the maximum voltage of forces to create and apply the mass army to several broken strategic directions, which in that period Russia was unable to do. The number of the Russian army in the Crimean War was 700 thousand people, and the Army of Turkey, together with the armies of the allied states, numbered 1 million people<7>.

<7> Titov Yu.P. The history of the state and the rights of Russia. M., 2003. P. 213.

The Russian army was inferior to the enemy not only in the number of troops, but also as weapons. It was equipped with smooth-bore rifles, the Turkish army and the army of its allies - with a row weapon. The Russian fleet consisted of outdated sailing ships. The fighting of the Ground Forces of Russia by groups of 30 - 100 thousand people turned around in the Balkans, the Caucasus and in the Crimea, and the fleet - on the Black Sea and the Pacific Ocean. These groupings needed extension during the war and replenishing losses that increased due to the use of the opponent of new means of armed struggle. However, feudal Russia was unable to solve such large strategic tasks<8>. This led to the fact that Russia was defeated, which undermined its international prestige, accelerated the creation of a revolutionary situation in the country and the abolition of serfdom.

<8> Ryutov F.V. The history of infantry. St. Petersburg., 1876. T. 3. P. 133.

The Crimean War gave impetus to the development of the Armed Forces of European states and their military and naval art. In Russia, this was manifested in military reform of 1860 - 1870, which was aimed at creating a mass army and the elimination of military retardation of Russia. The main content of this reform was:

replacing the recruitance of the all-known military service;
creation in the reserve of a military-trained reserve;
introduction of the new position "On the field management of troops in wartime"<9>;

<9> Zagoskin N.P. Science of the history of Russian law. Kazan, 1891. P. 157.

re-equipment of the army with rifled small arms and artillery;
reorganization of combat training, officer personnel training systems;
conducting military reforms and other events.

The ancestor of these reforms was General-Feldmarshal Count Milyutin Dmitry Alekseevich - Military Minister of Russia (1861 - 1881). During the reforms of D.A. Milyutin as never has increased the role of mobilization. The principle was based on the reforms of mobilization: "To develop combat forces in the greatest proportionality in wartime the smallest number Cash troops in peacetime "<10>. To implement this principle, 15 military districts were created, which can be deployed to army associations in wartime.

<10> Milyutin D.A. History of the war 1799 between Russia and France in the reign of Emperor Paul I. SPb., 1857. S. 117.

The basis of the deployment of the army was the principle of increasing the numerical composition not at the expense of the formation of new tactical units, and due to the completion of such units, which in peacetime were kept in abbreviated<11>. The number of divisions and regiments in peacetime due to the fact that they were kept in abbreviated composition, increased. This made it possible to increase the three-time personnel army of peacetime in a short time at a short time at a short time.

<11> Ibid. P. 168.

After the end of the Crimean War in 1856, the total service life in the army was reduced to 15 years, and the period of dismissal of permanent vacation was increased to 12 years<12>. Subsequently, the duration of the actual service was still reduced (in particular, in the period up to 1872. In the interests of creating military-trained reserves, it was consistently installed at 12, 10 and 7 years old with an indefinite leave (reserve) within 3, 5 and 8 years respectively). In addition, since 1856, the overseeness of the peaceful army began to dismiss on temporary holidays with a meeting with the reserve troops<13>. During stay on vacation with recruits, fees were periodically held.

<12> The highest command of May 15, 1856 and the Order of the Military Minister of 1856 N 111 // A complete meeting of the laws of the Russian Empire. 1856 T. VII.
<13> Ibid.

To increase the number of vacations, the difference between the states of peaceful and military time has been increased and communicated in every shelf to 975 people<14>. As a result, the number of troops of peacetime began to be 67 - 75% of wartime. Thus, until 1873, the system of increasing the number of the army of Russia in the event of the war was based on the possibilities for the call of the vacation lower ranks and officers, which, of course, could not solve the problem of creating a mass army in wartime.

<14> Orders of the Military Minister 1856 N 281 and 292 // Complete Assembly of the Laws of the Russian Empire. 1856 T. VII.

In 1873, at a special secret meeting, chaired by Alexander II, it was entrusted to determine the measures to increase the military-trained stock, accelerating the collection in the event of a military threat and the concentration of an unmobilized army at the war theater. This could be done by changing the recovery system, spreading military service not only for the submitted, but also to other estates of the country's population.

The draft charter on the Universal Military Meetility in December 1873, prepared by the Specially Created Commission, prepared at the General Assembly of the State Council and 1 (13) of January 1874, was approved by the emperor<15>. In accordance with it, all the men's population of the Empire aged from 20 to 40 years, capable of carrying a weapon, was obliged to serve the military service without the assumption of redemption; Part of this population was serving in permanent troops, and the other part in the militia (this was solved by the draw). The persons enrolled in the militia were called only in wartime.

<15> Complete collection of laws of the Russian Empire. 1874 T. VIII.

The total service life in permanent troops was established at 15 years (on the fleet - 10), of which the actual service is 6 years (on the fleet - 7) and 9 years in stock (on the fleet - 3 years). In the future, in order to accumulate the military-trained reserve, the valid service was reduced (though, without amending the Charter of the military service of 1874) to 5 years - in 1876, up to 4 years - in 1878, and then in 1881 G. He again became 5 year old.

In order to streamline the process of increasing (replenishment) of the army in 1876, the position "On the Call of Vacation" was published<16> And the schedule was compiled "about the call and appointment of holidays in the troops" (called the mobilization schedule N 1, which was approved on September 22 (October 4) 1876). It is from him that it is believed that the planned mobilization work began in Russia, all subsequent mobilization schedules are held from it - until World War II, 1914 - 1918. Schedules (in the account there were 19, 20th not developed to the end, therefore was not introduced) were compiled at the main headquarters, the highest was approved and annually specified.

<16> Orders of the Military Minister of 1876 N 298 // Complete Assembly of the Laws of the Russian Empire. 1876 \u200b\u200bT. IX.

New order The passage of the service entailed the abolition in 1876 the dismissal of the lower ranks into temporary and indefinite vacation; For them, only dismissal and resignation was left<17>.

<17> Orders of the Military Minister of 1876 N 205 // Complete Assembly of the Laws of the Russian Empire. 1876 \u200b\u200bT. IX.

Spare lower ranks were periodically called for educational fees, which were legalized only in 1887, but were rare - on the 5th and 10th service.

Turkish campaign (1877 - 1878) was a serious check of the conducted D.A. Milyutin reforms. In November 1877, for the first time in the history of the Russian army, mobilization was carried out in a short time. For 15 days, more than 200 thousand military-trained human resources from the reserve were called into the army. a large number of Horses and wagons. With the old system during the Crimean War to call in the army of 67 thousand people required more than five months<18>.

<18> Delbryuk G. History of Military Art in the framework of political history. M., 1938. T. 4. P. 344.

Thus, eND XIX. in. In Russia, a slender scientific theory of mobilization was created, including the preparation and accumulation of mobilization human resources, which was tested in practice and took a worthy place in Russia's military construction. At that time, mobilization understood the translation of all or parts of troops to martial law by supplementing them by lower ranks designed from the reserve, and the horses received from the population. By mobilization, it was planned to dowcompleting the existing troops of the abbreviated composition of peacetime and the formation of new divisions and regiments. Already then mobilization was two species: general and private (partial). Both types of mobilization assumed not the territorial principle of the recruitment of troops, and were taken into account as the main need for troops anywhere in their dustcompletion or formation.

The implementation of this principle was applied<19>:

<19> Rumyantsev PA Collection of documents. M., 1959. P. 522 - 536. T. III.

in the Russian-Turkish war 1877 - 1878 - two private mobilization (29 divisions were completed in the first and formed, in the second - 9 divisions);
in the Russian-Japanese war (1904 - 1906) - nine private mobilization with a call of more than 1 million people;
on the eve of the First World War from July 18 to August 1, 1914 in Russia - general mobilization, during which 3.1 million people were called upon. In just the first four months of war, more than 5 million people were called from the stock.

In 1883, the first "instruction on mobilization" was published. It defined the content and procedure for the development of a mobilization schedule (plan), the procedure for conducting tests in each military unit of test and experienced mobilization and accounting of horses. The adoption of these documents was laid the theoretical foundations of mobilization. As a result of the activities performed were carried out<20>:

<20> Military legislation of the Russian Empire (Code of Russian Military Law). M.: Wu, 1996.

introduction of the concept of mobilization need as a difference in the number of military and peaceful army;
creating stocks of military-trained human resources;
introduction of the system of accounting for mobilization human resources and universal military, military-horse and military-automotive service;
determination of the foundations of planning the deployment of military units to the states of military time due to the assignment of military-ridden and horses and their attribution to the military units.

14 (26) June 1888 was the highest approved the opinion of the State Council to officially reduce the duration of the actual service from 6 years established by the Charter of 1874, to 5. Moreover, by decision of Emperor Alexander III for infantry and walking artillery she again It became 4 years old. At the same time, the general term of military service was increased (from 15 to 18 years), and in accordance with this, the time of finding the lower ranks in the reserve has increased. Their number as a result has also increased.

After the overall service life of the person who was in stock was translated into a militia, where they consisted of 40 years of age (from 1891 to 43 years). Consisting in the state militia were called warriors and were divided into two discharge: the first faces of younger ages ranked first, i.e. enrolled in the militia of the four recent appeals; By the second - all the rest. The first discharge warriors were intended to replenish if the current troops are needed.

In 1880 - 1890s. The number of personnel army increased significantly, which contributed to a relatively rapid accumulation of the military-trained stock. By the end of the XIX century, the equilibrium between the volume of the military-trained stock and the mobilization need of the armed forces was achieved.

Thus, the basis of the second stage (1860 - 1904) of the development of mobilization and mobilization preparation was the principle of increasing the numerical composition not by the formation of new tactical units, but at the expense of the completion of such units, which in peacetime were kept in the abbreviated composition. Note that this principle of deploying of military units and compounds is also implemented. During the implementation of the second stage, the theoretical foundations of the mobilization were laid, the provisions of which were implemented and tested in a number of regulatory and guidelines that determine the content and procedure for developing a mobilization plan, the procedure for conducting in each military unit of verification and experienced mobilization.

Further development The theory and practice of mobilization, preparation and accumulation of mobilization human resources received in the period Russian-Japanese war (1904 - 1905) and during military reform 1905 - 1912. Russia joined the war with imperialist Japan as a progressive state of that time, which was different from the standard feudal state, but retained some of the traditions of feudalism. Russia in this war failed.

In connection with the defeat of Russia in the period 1905 - 1912 The army conducted a reform, during which the centralization of military departments was strengthened, the territorial system of the army was introduced, the service life in the army was reduced, the officer corps were rejuvenated, new programs for military schools were adopted, the financial situation of officers was improved. Mobilization planning was clarified, the quality of the staffing of the military time was improved, the reserves of the province, clothes, wagons and other property stored in stores began to be created (modern concept - warehouses and stocks of material means) of military units and military districts.

On March 7 (20), 1906, the highest decree was published on reducing the deadlines of the actual military service in the ranks of infantry and walking artillery from 4 to 3 years, in the other gods of weapons - up to 4, and on the fleet - from 7 to 5 years. The service in the reserve was established: in the infantry and walking artillery - 15 years, on the fleet - 5 years. The stock, as before, included two discharges: the first consisted of 8 younger ages and was intended for staffing when mobilizing field and reserve troops, the second - from 7 older ages and should have taken to replenish certain reserve troops and rear institutions.

In the state militia, the division into warriors remained the same. In 1908, a project transformation was developed specifically at the convened interdepartmental meeting, which in 1911 lay down the basis of the new law. Based on this law, the account was subject to, besides those listed from the stock, as many ages, starting with the younger, how much will be recognized as necessary, as well as all persons that could be used as officers and doctors. And if earlier, according to the law of 1891, the state militia was a "auxiliary regular army" composed of four generics of weapons having an organization similar to the army and intended for participation in hostilities ", now, according to a new law, it was intended to carry Auxiliary service in the near and deep rear.

These changes in the process of passing the actual military service and in the reserve were enshrined in the new charter on military service, adopted in 1912. In addition, it has decreased in it from 21 years to 20 years, the benefits of the family situation have been reduced and the benefits of education have been clarified<21>. Accounting for the total number of first-ranking warriors to be called, the distribution of the provinces and counties and the formation of the militia of the militia parts rested to the military ministry (earlier, in accordance with the Law of 1891, this right was provided to the land) in coordination with the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

<21> Madders A.A. Plan of war. Combat training // News of the Imperial Nikolaev Military Academy. 1913. N 40.

In the First World War, Russia entered into the following basics of military service (according to the Law of June 24 (July 6), 1914): Certain Age 20 years (by January 1, the time of call); The overall service life in the military-land forces - in the infantry and walking artillery of 18 years (the actual service of 3 years and 3 months, in stock 14 years and 9 months), in other generations of weapons - 17 years (real service of 4 years and 3 months, in reserve 12 years and 9 months); The total service life on the fleet is 10 years, including the actual service and in reserve for 5 years. The reserve was still divided into discharges: the first to replenish the field troops (until 30 years old), the second - reserve troops and rear institutions (until the age of 39 years). The militia, as before, was divided into two discharge, convened only in the event of war and bloomed after its end. It was intended to strengthen and replenish the permanent troops, the formation of individual teams and militia parts.

The preparation of spare and militias was carried out at the training fees, which could be carried out no more than two times 6 weeks during the entire period of stay in the reserve (militia), officers and stock officials - no more than three times to 8 weeks.

First world WarBy demanding the huge tension of all resources of the country, revealed the most serious shortcomings in the legislation on military service. In addition to the imperfection of the system of recruitment of the army and the fleet by a person (including a huge number of different kinds of benefits, about 8 million people could be delivered to the male population of a call age under a gun), which was unprepared for a long and intense war, and The system of accumulation and preparation of Mobryrseurs. Numerous changes in the charter on military service never touched the militia, and the huge category of the second-categorized warrids still could not be called to replenish the current army. Additional privileges for wealthy classes, in particular, new benefits by education, reduced the number of stock officers. The weak was and their preparation itself, besides rarely conducted. All this has adversely affected the combat capability of the Russian army. Reserves for replenishment just lacked.

Until the end of 1914, the entire stock was put under a gun, the mobilization of the first discharge warriors began. The front absorbed a monthly 300 thousand people.

In 1915, the newly adopted charter was changed. The warriors-militia of the second category went to the front, early calls were widely used. On February 3, 1917, the last appeal was held in this war. The front of the young men of 1898 of birth went to the front, 2 years 8 months earlier than its term (called 1919). In total, during the First World War, more than 14.5 million people were mobilized together with the personnel.

Thus, in pre-revolutionary Russia, with universal military service, the amount of military-trained stock was regulated by a decrease in the valid military service. Accounting for the militia and its military training were partial.

The legislative base of pre-revolutionary Russia, despite the system of accumulation and preparation of Mobryrseurs, has not been able to provide timely and quickly bringing the Russian army of peacetime to the necessary number at the time of the announcement of the war. Theoretically, the need to build armed forces on this basis was recognized, but this thought did not receive real exercise. According to the testimony of the contemporary B.A. Engelgardt, "Members of Legislative Chambers When considering the draft law (Charter of 1912) were more concerned about the interests of individuals than the needs and needs of the country's defense."

On the basis of the above, it can be concluded that during the third stage (1904 - 1918) received further development of the theory and practice of mobilization, preparation and accumulation of mobilization human resources. The problem of creating the mass army was solved by changing the principles of the recruitment of the army, reducing the timelines of the service, the benefits for the family situation and education, reducing the recruiting age. However, the results of the First World War showed that, despite the reforms carried out, the Russian army was unprepared to a long and intense war.

Currently, the military-political leadership of Russia comes from the fact that the probability of unleashing a large-scale war with the involvement of the Russian Federation is reduced to a minimum. Since the frontal collision of major army compounds is not projected, then the large army is not needed by the country. Moreover, the last decade of the army had to mainly solve the tasks of an antiterrorist nature. That is why many officials from the highest echelons of government believe that internal armed conflicts associated with attempts to manifest separatism and further destruction of Russia according to the model of the Soviet Union are the most dangerous for the Russian Federation.

Unpredictable future

That is why the main emphasis in the prediction of future wars was made on the local nature of military conflicts using high-precision weapons in the presence of a mobile compact army. Such prediction of military threats determines the relationship to the armed forces and the country's defense capability - the army is rapidly declining with the simultaneous increase in the number of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other power structures.

A completely different approach to future combat actions have the United States and the NATO block. They proceed from the fact that after 15-20 years, the problems of resource support in the world, primarily by mineral and energy resources, the maintenance of large-scale wars for the right of possessing by these resources will become an obvious reality. That is why there is an increase in the US military forces and the NATO blocks in regions rich in oil and gas, related to the zones of "strategic interests" (such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, etc.). "We will continue to play our leading role in the world so that this will reflect our national values \u200b\u200band defended the safety of this great nation." So it sounds one of the provisions of the US National Security Strategy for the New Century.

Former American President Bill Clinton emphasized more than once that "the United States will continue to strive for leadership in the world, relying on military power as one of the main tools foreign Policy", And since the ruling political circles represent the United States as" the only global power with worldwide interests, "then it follows that the Armed Forces of America in the 21st century should be capable of performing tasks to protect these interests at any point of the globe.

Currently, the United States and their allies already have in the territory of Eurasia under a gun over eight million people, over 11 thousand combat aircraft and forty thousand tanks, more than three hundred surface ships and over one and a half submarines, which total exceeds the possibilities of all Eurasian countries - not the US allies . Never in the post-war history, the NATO + Allies block did not possess such a military power.

At the same time, an unprecedented reduction in the number of personnel and military equipment is underway in the Russian army. Thus, according to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 600,000 officers, ensigns and Michmanov were reduced from 1997 to 2005, in addition to 450 thousand personnel soldiers, dismissed in the reserve in 1991-1996. Soon the number of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will decrease to one million people. And this is not the limit: according to the calculations of some "strategists", our economy allows you to contain the entire number of no more than 600-700 thousand people. So, our army will soon be reduced by 400 thousand people in the near future.

Of course, while Russia regularly exports oil, natural gas, Forest and other minerals, that is, it works out the role of the raw materials appendage of developed countries, the large-scale war is not threatened to us. However, as soon as the Russian Federation wants to become a truly developed country with its independent politics, the war will not be avoided. Therefore, a misunderstanding of the need to increase the power of the armed forces today can become a deadly mistake for Russia tomorrow.

Who can predict how events will develop in the world with an increase in the energy crisis? It is possible only in general terms, it is necessary to determine what rivalry between those who control the resources and fertile land will increase. Even minister agriculture The Russian Federation Alexey Gordeev believes that Russia in 10-15 years old risks to face the claims of a number of countries on productive land. This is due to the fact that today our country owns 10% of the world's reserves of productive pashnya, where no more than 2% of the population of the Earth lives. "It is clear that such a disproportion without cultivation, supporting the lifestyle on the agricultural sorts of Russia, without understanding the authorities that the land is a renewable resource, can lead to deplorable consequences," said Gordeev.

Only imagine that tomorrow war. Not Chechen, but real, as in Iraq, with tank attacks, massive bombers, front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Similar after all seems unrealistic. But it is not easy to guess, in what form it will happen. Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Iraq showed us clearly how modern wars and conflicts arise instantly and how hard they pay those states that do not have strong armies and in peacetime failed to prepare for war. Currently, Russia, with a real state of its armed forces, is once vulnerable to an external threat, which may arise suddenly, due to changes in some global conjuncture.

What is opposed to?

As the story showed, we cannot hope for someone from the outside: we see how Russia gives her former allies and neighbors, and even those nations that she saved from full extermination. Support only on powerful army and fleet ≈ the only and reliable principle of the development of our nation. Without decent armed forces, Russia cannot be strong, free and prosperous. The trends in the development of modern history are talking about one thing: to be of Russia or not to be ≈ is mainly depends on the state of its armed forces.

If you seriously assess the possibility of direct aggression against the Russian Federation, then, based on the assessment of the directions of scientific and technological progress and the development of the military-strategic situation in the world, the most dangerous for Russia will be the period from 2010 to 2025. It was by this time that the North Atlantic Alliance will accumulate high-precision funds in the amount necessary for conducting a large-scale war, and China will affect the possibility of solving territorial problems from the position of strength and confidence in achieving the goals by military means.

Let's try to figure out what can oppose Russia in a collision with such strong opponents. By 2010, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, abbreviated over the "economic need" to 600 thousand people, will not be able to solve the problem of conducting a regional, more or less long war in Europe or the Far East. Even our government is openly talking about it.

Thus, in the "actual tasks of the development of the armed forces" - the document, which determined the construction of the modern army and the fleet, it was said that in modern conditions the Russian army is not able to protect the territory of the state along the entire "front". Therefore, it was decided to create parts of a constant combat readiness, which in a short time can be transferred to a particular area of \u200b\u200bthe country, and there are already reservoir. In other words, the rate is done for the presence of prepared mobilization resources that become the main security pledge of our country.

This confirms the head of the General Staff General of the Army, Yuri Baluyevsky. He is convinced: "Despite the priority role of the troop groups deployed by the time of the threatened period, a significant role in the outcome of the armed conflict will be played by the presence of strategic reserves. This will make it possible to maintain a power response resource for any development of the situation during the armed conflict. "

But in this regard, a natural question arises: and in what condition our mobilization resources are and how is the country's mobilization preparation?

One of the most important factors

Experience Great Patriotic War Indicates that during active hostilities, the tank brigade "burns out" for three days, and the platoon commander Ground Forces Lives no more than two days. Forecasting possible battle losses, it can be assumed that in the case of a large-scale war (even without the use of weapons of mass lesion), the Russian personnel army in the current state will be able to hold out no more than one and a half months. Further everything will depend on our mobilization ability.

In modern conditions, with a good professional army, you can defeat the campaign, but ultimately the war will be lost in the absence of due mobilization training of the country.

It should be noted that mobilization preparation in any country of the world occurs in peacetime, and the mobilization itself is usually carried out with the declaration of war. The most important conditions for successful mobilization: the presence of a sufficient number of prepared human reserves for downtacking to the state of military time associations, compounds and parts and deployment of new formations; accumulation in the peacetime of the necessary reserves of weapons, military equipment, ammunition, fuel and other material resources; the presence of a clearly spent alert system, collection and distribution of mobilization resources, reconversion of enterprises carrying out the supply of equipment; Clear and uninterrupted mobilization management and its comprehensive provision.

Unfortunately, the situation and the country's mobilization preparation is critical. For the first time, this was announced in 2001, when the meeting of the Security Council in the Kremlin was fully devoted to the state of the mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces. It was there, for the first time after the collapse of the USSR, a statement sounded a very sad state of affairs - the army is practically not ready for the maintenance of a modern war, but the country's mobilization readiness at zero. Of course, in the past three years there has been some tendency towards solving problems of mobilization training. So, for the first time in the last 15 years, in budgets for 2005 and 2006, the expenses of these goals were allocated a separate line. However, this is only a drop in the sea, and to make the right decisions, it is necessary to objectively analyze the existing problems in the country's mobilization preparation.

Five basic problems

So, the first problem: ensuring the consideration of sufficient volume with a continuously deteriorating demographic situation. To support the army at an existing level, it is necessary to annually call for at least 300 thousand young people. However, the demographic situation in the country is constantly deteriorating, according to experts, the number of people suitable for military service in 2007 will be only 800 thousand people, in 2003 it was about 2 times more. (Why was such a demographic failure for several years - obviously. The 17-18-year-old young man who has reached this age in 2003, was born in 1985-1986, which followed these years and how many children were born, everyone knew well).

Currently, 9 categories of citizens who can be granted a delay in law. The most numerous category are students. Currently, the question of cancellation for students is raised periodically. The media is constantly accused of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff is that they are waiting for education. It seems that in the conditions of predominantly paid training on the abolition of a deferment to students, legislators are unlikely to be solved. The remaining deferments are more or less reasonable and generally few.

The second problem is the quality of the draft contingent. In the modern army, competent people should serve, and we have 80% of Russian conscripts - residents of villages, villages and small cities, the level of preparation of which is quite low. Of them are only every twentieth (for the city, this figure is two times better - every tenth). As of 2004, 21% of the recruits of spring call did not have a secondary education, 5% could not even read and write. Is it possible to expect improvements in this area? I would like, but for this we need large-scale actions in a national scale: an increase in health and education, sufficiently volumetric initial military training, etc. For the year, compared with 2004, nothing has changed. Quality of the call contingent in 2005: Only every second citizen of the draft age was considered suitable for medical records (not healthy, but simply suitable!), 20% of recruits had only primary education, 6% - criminal past. But this is despite the fact that this year a record small number of young people from all persons of the draft group was called into the army in the army - 9.5%. This is an unprecedented phenomenon, there was no such thing in the royal or in Soviet army. Mentally move in 2008. In very best case Of the 400 thousand well-friendly young people need to be gained by calling 300 thousand. How real are such plans?

It is necessary to take into account political moments, first of all related to the dissemination of international terrorism. For example, in the Chechen Republic in 2004, 39 people and 40 officers concluded contracts from the Ministry of Defense were called into the urgent service.

With regard to hopes for the recruitment of the army by contract soldiers - citizens of the CIS, which can rush into the army for Russian citizenship. In the Caucasus and in Transnistria, most residents and so have Russian passports. And in relation to residents of Central Asia and the Caucasus, it would be necessary to think that Muslim, or rather, the Wahhabi factor.

You can also give other digits, but these are enough for, let's say so, with surprise to detect it seems to be a non-obvious thing: even a millionth army modern Russia "Do not raise."

The third problem, which is currently timidly silent and concerns officers who will undergo a service in parts of the contract and "non-contract" picking. Obviously, the conditions for the service of these officers will be different, but the conditions of service in the "non-contrace" parts will be not easier than among officers undergoing service in the "contract" parts. But what will be the level of payment for these officers? Unfortunately, it can be significantly lower than that of the "contract" officers. Where it leads? In the composition of the armed forces can be formed essentially two armies.

An annual decline in the number of officers in Russia is 5-7%. From the army, mostly junior officers leave. In 2004, MO was forced to urge 15 thousand graduates of civil universities in military service - stock officers. Military and educational institutions in their current composition are not able to prepare the proper number of personnel officers in conditions of such a high outflow. The reasons for the care of officers from the army are well known - a low level of patch and the lack of social benefits.

Further, most of the mobilization base is obstructed, except for unjustified costs does not give anything and is not capable of anything. And here we are faced with another problem. This in this case is about the possibilities for the formation of reserves of various queues. This problem is associated with the lack of a sufficient number of stocks of modern weapons and military equipment.

So, the quadruple problem is the material and technical support of mobilization resources. After all, mobilization preparation is not only human mobilization resources. We need people to call, dress, shore, arm, prepare, etc., before sending into battle. Let us ask yourself: what will the motorized rifle division be fighting, say, from the composition of the strategic reserves of the 2nd line, if such was deployed? It can be armed with small arms and grenade launchers, diverse artillery, T-64 tanks, outdated communications, BMP is not provided. The battle should go to the wheel, mobilized from the "folk" farm (the so-called technique of enterprises and organizations). Squadron of modern fighter aircraft can replace such a division if it comes to the battlefield of the Kursk arc type. Maybe to send such a division to protect the city, because the modern war will be conducted on an increasingly urbanized area? In urban battles, technical superiority is not so significant. An individual skill plays a more important role, and it is just not! In relation to such a division, we get into the enchanted circle: there is no way on the field - there is no technique, there is no skill in the city - there are no skills. How to arm these 50 thousand people? Modern weapons, military equipment and equipment lacks for the personnel army. Personnel officers in the rank-battalion ring in the unfolded parts - will not be, and the officers of the reserve, according to the Minister of Defense, are not ready for war. Lieutenants lack and for parts of constant readiness. Troops assembled with Boru on the pine troops in the war using conventional means of defeat with the armies of industrialized countries of the West and the East can not be equal. The number of tasks in such a war is not solved, and we do not have this number.

The fifth problem is the lack of a sufficient number of military human resources. Only 45% of citizens who did not lose training on VUS and capable of carrying out their tasks are intended for compounds and military units. By 2010, it is expected that this figure will decrease up to 20%, the remaining 80% is the mass, which, as recruits, has long to learn before allowing weapons and military equipment to apply. At the same time, the main source of accumulation of military curriculum - military service - currently does not provide accumulation in areas of the recruitment of troops (forces) of the required specialists in volumes providing their full and high-quality staffing, and in many specialties does not even ensure the replenishment of natural decrease of citizens, staying in stock and attributed to troops (forces). To ensure the stable quality of the staffing of the troops, mobilization human resources, it is necessary to attract at least 400-450 thousand people to military fees, and about 100 thousand people manage to be held. Yes, and this quantity every year is more difficult to call, the main reason is the lack of economic incentives. According to the law attracted to the fees, a person with an average earnings of 7 thousand rubles can only be obtained for them only 1 thousand rubles. Plus the surcharge for the military rank and the position in the troops during the passage of fees. The amount is not at all impressive if it takes into account that the salary of the lieutenant is about 4 thousand rubles. In ordinary and sergeants, an understandable thing, earning even less.

In order not to bother readers, multiple a number of significant problems of mobilization preparation: the extremely uneven distribution of human resources in the country's territory; insufficient and continuously reduced level of preparation of a military-trained reserve; Low growth rates of the military-trained reserve; Extremely low level of funding for military training of mobilization human resources; Low efficiency of mobilization training events, etc.

No less significant situation with expenses for mobilization training. "Mobilization readiness of the economy" is not new aircraft, rockets or tanks, this is an investment of funds in the preservation of production factories and factories that may be required at an ix hour. For example, in 2002, only 0.5 billion rubles were allocated for 2.3 thousand enterprises related to the provision of state defense capability. By 2005, the number of such enterprises has already decreased to 1300. This is due to the fact that in the post-pre-drawn years of the mobility of most domestic enterprises, either the most horrors, or minimized - despite the fact that they did not participate in the production of products, the owners of enterprises had to pay taxes from them , Pay for electricity and heat. They did it a few, mostly those who remained in the public sector, private traders came easier - dismantled unnecessary equipment, and the liberated workshops were allowed to commercially favorable production. As a result, many technological chains were destroyed in the production of weapons and military equipment.

We need a balanced approach

So, the need to work on issues of improving mobilization preparation is obvious. But too many problems. Therefore, it would be necessary to determine the importance and priority order to address issues. Now we need a weighted look.

According to the author, the only way out of the established situation is a balanced approach to the accumulation of military-trained mobilization reserves and IWT in limited volumes, provided that the necessary number of armed forces is revised to increase and equip the army with modern weapons. The obviousness of this approach is evidenced by the experience of mobilization preparation of the United States. Officially, mobilization planning in the American industry is regulated in the framework of the so-called "industrial readiness planning program". According to regulations established by the planning program of the industry's mobilization readiness, backup equipment in case of mobilization should be removed from storage, declined, delivered to the place of use, established and fully prepared for the release of products no later than 60 days after the mobilization announcement.

For the US military-political leadership, with a population of 280 million people, with a general economic potential equal to 30% of world production, in principle there is no problem of resources. The share of the exemptions of a human resource from the US economy is only 0.45%, and the military budget is the sum of the military budgets of the ten subsequent in the list of leading military powers. Stable high level The US Armed Forces allows you to contain a professional army of 2.3 million people. Including - 1.7 million personnel composition, whose security exceeds the "world standards" is 3-4 times.

Since 1992, the former political and military leadership of the Russian Federation, bearing in mind, first of all, the reduction of "non-production costs in order to strengthen the economy", under the pretext of bringing military organization to international standards, consistently reduced the number of personnel of the Sun for 2001 to 1.2 million This priority indicator was the cost of the content of personnel. At the same time, with a drop in production, 2 times at the same time there was a reduction in budget allocations for the maintenance of the aircraft from 6-7% in the late 1980s to 2.7% of GDP in 2001. The resourcelessness of one serviceman decreased from 20-23 thousand to 4-5 thousand dollars. Obviously, without increasing the number of Sun and the re-equipment of the Russian army, it does not make sense for solving problems of mobilization preparation.

In Russia, the implementation experiment begins new system Preparation and accumulation of mobilization human resources. Sin would not be forging about these most events, thanks to which the preparation and the indocence is planned a lot of good and different.

What is required to accumulate mobilization resources?

That's right, people are required to prepare and accumulate mobilization resources. And people require relevant conditions for increasing their population. And since on the territory of Russia, the birth rate is distributed in the regions well, very uneven, it is worth trying to look at why?

The first thing you pay attention to is at a higher birth rate where patriarchal traditions are the most powerful, and the population mainly lives in private homes, and not in apartments. Moreover, less fertility and a greater loss of the population where the excess of the apartments is recorded above the houses:

"A particularly significant excess - by 10-23% - is noted in regions with an intensive loss of the population: a number of areas of the Far North and Central Russia, but most of all - by 43.6% - in Chukchi autonomous Districtlost by last years More than two thirds of their population. "(http://polit.ru/art...)

So the first necessary event for the accumulation of resources of a mobilization reserve is its home - the basis of large families, and consolidation in civil society priority of family values. Ingushetia, for example, where these priorities have been preserved better, and most people live in their homes - 54% of families are large. And in St. Petersburg, where private houses are exotic, and family values, let's say, are not dominant, only 1% of families are large families. In more detail about the influence of housing on the birth rate, you can read, for example, here: "How to stop the abyss ..."

The second necessary event concerning the preparation referred to in the decree clearly prescribed Bismarck, who was not the generals, and school teachers and parish priests won the war. But about the ege Bismarck said nothing. Therefore, they consider it so far smart person And in the West and East ...

The overall impression of the decree:

Russia is planted around the perimeter, and the Russian authorities, understanding this, and also realizing that regular troops will not shut up all holes on the multi-thousand metering border, it begins to rush, realizing that the catastrophically undalunned territory is, of course, the joy for the commodity civilization, but total The problem for a country going to protect its territory both from organized pseudo-democratic liberals to coupled with pseudomusulm national fascists and from wild Velicukov.

And new inventions here are unlikely to ride. The concentration of the population in megalopolis in the dismounting outback, perfectly solves the problem of managing the population, but the disgusting - the problem of expanded reproduction of these resources of the mobilization reserve. So, the exit, as always, two - or to the sources, or on the dump of history, together with all the decrees, for nothing arises from a scratch, everything is built on the foundation, which was the ancestors that had exactly the same problems and quite effectively them solved. It is only necessary to learn from them to learn and not forget that it was ancient times the basis of the "system of preparation and accumulation of human resources".

The basis of mobilization capabilities

The mobilization features of the state are based on the financial costs of the state produced by the following needs:

Creation of foreign exchange reserves necessary to maintain the state economy during military situation;
Creation of food reserves;
Creation of a reserve of military equipment, weapons, military assets (ammunition, equipment, ammunition) and fuel and lubricants;
Periodic training of stock servicemen and monitoring the military accounting contingent of the population;
Initial military training in the system of secondary and secondary special education;
Preparation and training of stock officers in civil universities.

Factors affecting mobilization capabilities

The mobilization features of the state depend on the following factors:

The presence of heavy industry and mechanical engineering;
The presence of a developed transport structure;
Level of economic development and type of state economy;
Regulating the role of the state;
Political structure of the state;
Number of state population;
The level of moral and psychological and general education training (literacy) of the population

Criteria for mobilization capabilities

Human resource

The main criterion of the mobilization capabilities of the state is the human resource. The meaning of the criterion is in the amount of the population that the state, if necessary, is able to mobilize into the armed forces.
The minimum level of the mobilization potential of the state for peacetime, under which the number of personnel is understood directly armed Forcesis 0.5-1% of the total population of the state. With this indicator, the armed forces are able to fully function and develop, while ensuring the external security of the state.
In the case of the start of large-scale hostilities, the required level of mobilization potential of the state is estimated from 10 to 20%.

Military-technical potential

Under the military-technical potential implies the number and quality of combat technology available in the armed forces.
The main conditions for the presence of military-technical potential are considered:

Sufficient amount of military equipment (aircraft, helicopters, ships, tanks, guns, radar, rocket weapons and so on)
Quality of military equipment (compliance modern requirements, working condition)

The preservation of military-technical potential is to continuously modernize and develop new samples of weapons, service of military equipment and creating weapons and ammunition to them.

Military budget

In some states, the main emphasis is not on the maintenance of regular troops, namely, the system of preparation of reservists, in which almost all of the men's population (militia army) is involved. For example, in Switzerland, for some estimates, armed forces appealing 22,000 people are able to mobilize 650,000 reservists in their ranks in several hours, and over two days 1,700,000 reservists.

Mobilization reservoirs

In the case of a military threat or the beginning of the war, the government is declared partial or universal mobilization and reservists after their alerts follow in the areas of collection, where, under the management of representatives of the State Department of State, reserve military formations will be created.

In some states, due to legislation, mass mobilization of reservists can be declared without the introduction of military situation and without a military threat. Examples of such mass mobilization can be:

There are exceptions in the approach to the frequency of mobilization of reservists when it can begin without any military threat from the outside. For example, in such states as Israel, except for systematic retraining, reservists together with regular troops directly participate in hostilities. In practice, this is that any large troop operation of the IDF, begins with the mobilization of reservists.

Deploying formations

To create full-fledged formations from reservists, it is necessary to have a sufficient amount of weapons, military equipment and military assets in storage warehouses. In this regard, the approach to deploying the formations in most states is the same and is to create the lessed parts.
On the example of the USSR Armed Forces and the Armed Forces of the Former USSR states, it looks like the presence in the structure of each regional military command (military district) of military units of the part-time state (lean part), in whose warehouses are located on long storage combat vehicles, Military property and weapons.

For example, it can be a motorized rifle regiment, in which only one battalion or company will be deployed at full state. In this case, the amount of weapons in the warehouses of the driver corresponds to a similar indicator in a fully discharged motorized rifle shelf. All combat equipment and weapons are in a canned state (rechargeable batteries removed, cooling fluids and fuel are merged, the wheels are raised to the brackets and so on and the like).

According to the mobilization plan, the reservists of the officer and ordinary composition are arriving, which are engaged in bringing combat and other equipment and armaments to combat readiness. In the 1990s, similar lessed parts were renamed Military Storage and Repair Bases (BHIVT) .

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